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ABSTRACT

Approaches to the organization and administration of higher education drawn from other countries are presented. In some countries, higher education is coordinated by a central bureaucracy in which there is such nationalization of the curriculum, a nationalized degree structure, and a nationalized system of admissions. This approach is contrasted to decentralized and diversified systems which are more responsible to societal changes. The control of higher education by a monopoly of power or by a single form of organization is discussed. Decision-making needs to take place closer to the participants and the realities of local operating conditions. Cross national comparison indicates the insufficiency of uniform institutions and the need for institutional differentiation. The European version of open-door access and the notion of educational equality are discussed. Autonomous action and planning are both needed as mechanisms of differentiation, coordination, and changes. (SW)

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THE CHANGING RELATIONS BETWEEN
HIGHER EDUCATION AND GOVERNMENT:
SOME PERSPECTIVES FROM ABROAD

by

Burton R. Clark*

YALE HIGHER EDUCATION RESEARCH GROUP
WORKING PAPER

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This working paper is a revised version of a presentation made to the Inservice Education Program Seminar organized by the Education Commission of the States for the 24th Annual Meeting of the State Higher Education Executive Officers (SHEEO) of the American system, held at Big Sky, Montana, August 2, 1977. The paper represents an effort to carry out the third of the three tasks to which the Yale Higher Education Research Group is committed: intensive country study; comparative analysis; and the drawing of implications from cross-national research for policy deliberations in the United States and other countries.

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In recent speeches and writings, Congressman John Brademas has presented a strong case for the development of broad analytical frameworks within which legislators, governors, state educational officials, university administrators, faculty members, and others can make wiser decisions about post-secondary education.¹ Although his point was made in the context of problems of finance that have loomed large since 1970, the argument may be applied to many issues. It is not that we so much need to generate from research a stream of specific answers to nuts-and-bolts problems, a narrow social-engineering approach, as we need additional ways of grasping the complex realities of education and especially its high-level coordination, an approach of increased sophistication. In fact, it has become clear by now that research on education, especially higher education, will not produce brilliant technical solutions to pressing operational problems: we must relinquish that expectation of educational R & D.² Research affects educational practices significantly in ways that are broad, slow, and unobtrusive, primarily by helping us to understand educational phenomena differently. It can alter incrementally the premises upon which decisions are made and add angles of vision that lead to new insights.

As we look around for research that may cause us to see things in a different light, we find we are still underinvested and short-handed. Congressman Brademas noted: "Surely it is anomalous that there has been so little intellectual effort of high quality directed to research on and analysis of those institutions of our society that presumably incarnate and advance intellectual effort."³ Recent years have seen some improvement, in the massive work of The Carnegie Commission (now Council) on Higher Education;

the increased attention of the American Council on Education and other national associations to policy analysis, and a greater investment by social scientists in the study of higher education. But the recent improvement is only a beginning. Indeed, we may be only standing still in the contribution of inquiry to practice, or even falling behind, since practitioners work in turbulent environments, fast-changing times in which new problems may race ahead of new answers to old problems.

As we search for useful angles of vision, there are different directions in which we can turn. One is to history: as so often remarked, those who will not learn from history are doomed to repeat the errors of the past. A second direction is to cross-national comparison: those who will not learn from the experience of other countries are likely to repeat the errors of others. In thinking about postsecondary education, Americans have remained somewhat isolated and insular, for a number of reasons: we are the largest system; we know our system has been the one most widely acclaimed since the second quarter of this century; we are geographically separated from the other major national models; we have many unique features; and we are busy and have more pressing things to do in Montana as well as in New York than to ask how the Austrians and Swedes do it. But there is a great deal to learn about ourselves by learning about others, in this very important sector of society to which we devote our lives, and it is wise that we learn in advance of the time when events will force us to do so. To use an analogy, American business could have studied the Japanese way of business organization, and the German way, and even the Swedish way, a quarter of a century ago instead of waiting until virtually forced to do so in the 1970s by worsening competitive disadvantage and worker discontent. Cross-national thinking encourages

the long view in which, for once, we might get in front of our problems. We might even find out what not to do, while there is still time not to do it. The perspectives that I draw from comparative research, as stated below, indicate that we are now making changes that (a) deny the grounds on which we have been successful to date, and (b) may well lead to arrangements that will seriously hamper us in the future.

To help develop the kind of broad analytical framework that Congressman Brademas has called for, from the vantage point of cross-national comparison, I will develop a set of ideas here in skeletal form as five lessons from abroad. These five points are interconnected, and the first three, which are largely "do nots" or warnings, set the structural stage for the last two, which are affirmations of what should remain central in our minds as touchstones of leadership and statesmanship in postsecondary education.

Lesson One: Central Bureaucracy Cannot Effectively Coordinate Mass Higher Education. Many nations have struggled for a long time to coordinate higher education by means of a national ministry of education, treating higher education as a sub-government of the national state. The effort has been to achieve order, effectiveness, and equity by national rules applied across the system by a national bureau. Good examples of this approach in Western Europe can be found in France, which has struggled with its possibilities and limitations for a century and a half, since Napoleon created a unitary and unified national system of universities; and, in Italy, which has moved in this direction for over a century, since the unification of the nation.⁴ In many of the well-developed cases, in Europe and elsewhere, we find not only a nationalized system of finance, but also: (a) much nationalization of the curriculum with common mandated courses in centrally approved fields of study;

(b) a nationalized degree structure, in which degrees are awards of the national system and not of the individual university or college; (c) a nationalized personnel system, in which all university personnel are members of the civil service, and hired, promoted, and given status accordingly; and (d) a nationalized system of admissions, in which national rules determine access and grant student rights and privileges. Such features of administered order within a unified system obtain strongly, of course, in Communist-controlled or Communist-influenced states, such as East Germany and Poland, since there the dominant political philosophy asserts strong state control, effected by a dependable top-down structure of command.⁵

In addition, there are countries, such as West Germany, in which this heavy reliance on central bureaucracy takes place at the state or provincial level of government, rather than at the national level, but with no less thoroughness and severity.⁶ Again there is the minister and his immediate staff at the peak of an all-encompassing pyramid, with a division or bureau of higher education under him (or her) in the central office through which all transactions pass.

This approach worked to some degree back in the days when the number of students and teachers was so small as to be characterized, in retrospect, as elite higher education--and we now know why it worked at all. A bargain was struck, in which power was split between bureaucrats and professors. There were no trustees in these systems, since private individuals were not to be trusted with the care of a public interest, and campus administrators did not constitute a separate force. Professors developed the personal and collegial forms of control that could underpin personal and group freedom in teaching and research, so that the operating levels of the systems generally

were in their hands. Notably, they elected their own deans and rectors and kept them on short-term recall and turnover. Hence the professors were the power on the local scene, with the state officials often remote, even entombed hundreds of miles away in a Kafkaesque administrative monument. State bureaucracy sometimes became a mock bureaucracy, a set of pretenses behind which oligarchies of professors were the real rulers, nationally as well as locally. The public was always given to understand that there was single-system accountability, while, inside the structure, power was actually so fractured and scattered that feudal lords ruled sectors of the organizational countryside. In general, one can refer to a traditional European mode of academic organization, in which power is concentrated at the top (in a central bureaucratic staff) and at the bottom (in the hands of chaired professors), with a weak "middle" at the levels of the university and its major constituent parts.

Whatever the bargain struck in the days of elite higher education, and the resulting dominance of either bureaucrats or professors, the approach of the unitary governmental pyramid has become increasingly deficient as expansion of the last quarter-century has changed the scale of operations and the nature of academic tasks. Student clientele is not only more numerous but more varied: consumer demands proliferate. The connections to employment are more numerous and varied: labor-force demands proliferate. The disciplines and fields of knowledge that a system of higher education is supposed to encompass increase steadily in number and variety, driven by the internal proliferation of specialized work as well as by demands of external occupational groups. In short, the task structure of modern higher education is increasingly different in kind from that found in other sectors of public administration, especially in the breadth of coverage of fields of knowledge

that stretch from archaeology to zoology, with business, law, physics, and psychology thrown in. Across the gamut of fields, knowledge is supposed to be discovered—the research imperative—as well as transmitted and distributed—the teaching and service imperatives. On top of this coverage of all the higher-level specialties in modern society's division of labor has come an accelerated rate of change which makes it all the more difficult for generalists at middle and top levels of coordination to catch up with and comprehend what the specialists are doing.

There is little remaining doubt about what the transition from elite to mass higher education means by way of required "response" of structured state and national systems: It means that viability increasingly depends on: (a) plural rather than singular reactions, or the capacity to face simultaneously in different directions with contradictory reactions to contradictory demands; (b) quicker reactions, by at least some parts of the system, to certain of the demands; and (c) a command structure that allows for the needed myriad adaptations to the increasing variation of special contexts and local conditions. A unified system coordinated by a state bureaucracy is not set up to work in these ways. The unitary system resists a differentiated and flexible approach of diversified response. Many reformers in and out of government in such countries as Sweden, France, and Italy now realize this, at least in part, so that the name of the game for them at this point in history is decentralization, an effort to deconcentrate academic administration out of the capitol and central offices to regions, local authorities, and campuses: But this is extremely difficult to do through planned, deliberate effort, since state officials who have firmly-fixed power do not normally give it away—abroad as well as in the United States!—especially if they are

still held responsible by the public, the legislature, and the chief executive for what occurs. But at least responsible people in many countries have been educated by now to the faults of unitary coordination, after long efforts to achieve its promised virtues, and are thinking of ways to break up central control. They are almost ready to take seriously that great admirer of American federalism, Tocqueville, who maintained over a century ago that while countries can be successfully governed centrally, they cannot be successfully administered centrally. There is surely no realm other than higher education to which this principle can be more justifiably applied.

Meanwhile, in the United States, historically blessed with decentralization and diversity, within states as well as among them, we are hankering after the promised virtues: economy, efficiency, elimination of overlap, reduction of redundancy, better articulation, transferability, accountability, equity and equality. Our dominant line of reform since World War II, and at an accelerating rate, has been to intrude into the disorder of a market system of higher education with higher levels of coordination that promise administered order. If our current momentum toward bureaucratic centralism is maintained, first at the state level and then at the national, we may live to see the day when we catch up with our friends abroad or even pass them as they travel in the opposite direction. Unless strong counterforces are brought into play, unitary arrangements at the state level will increasingly take on characteristics of a ministry of education. The administrative staffs will grow, and the powers of central board and staff will shift increasingly from weakly-proffered advice toward a primary role in the allocation of resources and in the approval of all decisions thought crucial for the system as a whole. Legislators, governors, and relevant publics who have been demanding that someone be in charge will increasingly saddle

the central board and staff with the responsibility for--economy, efficiency, equity, etc. And the oldest organizational principle in the world tells us that authority should be commensurate with responsibility. The trend toward central bureaucratic coordination is running strong, easily seen if we look back over the last three decades and compare state structures of coordination in 1945, 1955, 1965, and 1975.

In case we have any doubt about how fast such an evolutionary trend can change matters in a democratic nation we have only to observe the change in Great Britain. The British were long famous, like us, for institutional autonomy. As government money became increasingly the source of support, they constructed and developed a device, the University Grants Committee, which became, between 1920 and 1965, the foremost model in the world of how to have governmental support without governmental control. But how things have changed in the last decade! The U.G.C., which initially received its monies directly from the Treasury and doled out lump sums with few questions asked, now must work with the national education department; and the department and the U.G.C. have both become instruments of national educational policy as that is determined by the party in power and senior administrators in the department. Now, in the mid-1970s, these central offices between them ask all kinds of questions of the institutions, decide to favor one sector at the expense of another, tell some colleges whom they previously could not touch to close their doors, and suggest to other universities and colleges that they ought not attempt to do A, B, and C if they would like to maintain the goodwill of those who must approve the budget on the next round. The situation is still some distance from that of a Continental ministry of education, but the evolution in that direction has recently been swift in what is increasingly a nation-

alized system of higher education. The central administrative machinery, for the best of short-run reasons, is becoming the primary locus of power.

We are still far different in such matters since our own centralization is first taking place at the state level. This allows for: (a) diversity among the states; (b) competition among the systems; (c) some escape of personnel and clientele to other systems when any one system is in decline or otherwise becomes particularly unattractive; and (d) a chance for some states to learn from the successes and failures of others. It can pay sometimes to be an attentive laggard! But some of the experience of other countries in central bureaucratic coordination is surely relevant to what we are heading into at the state level. And, central offices at the national level in the United States, as we all know, have a qualitatively different posture in the mid-1970s from one or two decades earlier. The quaint notion of taking away all federal monies flowing to an institution, when it fails to obey a particular federal rule, actually leaps over to the far side of stern relations between government and higher education in democratic countries with national ministries of education. Our own national level will surely ricochet around on such matters for some years to come, while Federal officials learn to make the punishment fit the crime. But the new world of federal coordination into which we are moving rapidly was made perfectly clear by the latest Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare in a speech at the 1977 meeting of the American Council on Education, when, to an audience of hundreds of university and college presidents, he pointed out that since a recent bit of legislation not desired by academics was now national law, they would have to comply, in his words, and he would have to enforce. From the market to the minister in a decade!

In short: we could learn from the monumental bad luck of our friends on the European continent, who are now trying to head in the opposite direction, of their having had in place a unified administrative structure as the co-ordinating instrument for coping with mass higher education when expansion hit them in the last twenty years. We could learn from the experience of the British in evolving rapidly in the last decade toward dependence on central bureaucracy as an answer to the immediate demands of effectiveness and equity. But as matters now stand, it seems likely that we will not learn in time from vicarious experience, but rather will learn the hard way from brute direct experience after we have repeated the errors of others.

Lesson Two: The Greatest Single Danger in the Control of Higher Education is a Monopoly of Power. For two good reasons: a monopoly expresses the interests and perspectives of just one group, shutting out the expression of other interests; and no one group is wise enough to solve all the problems. The history of higher education exhibits monopolies and near-monopolies by various groups: students in some medieval Italian universities, who, through student guilds, could hire and fire professors and hence obtain favors from them; senior faculty in some European and English universities in the last two centuries, who, answering to no one, could sleep for decades; trustees in some early and not-so-early American colleges who could and did fire presidents and professors for not knowing the proper number of angels dancing on the head of the ecclesiastical pin, or, within our lifetime, for simply smoking cigarettes and drinking martinis; autocratic presidents in some American institutions, especially teachers colleges, who ran campuses as personal possessions; and, of course, state bureaucratic staffs and political persons in Europe and America, past and present, democratic and non-democratic.

A monopoly of power can be a useful instrument of change: some states in Western Europe normally immobilized in higher education have effected large changes only when a combination of crisis events and a strong ruler produced a temporary monopoly, e.g., France in 1968 under DeGaulle. But the monopoly does not long work well, soon becoming a great source of rigidity and resistance to change, freezing organizations around the rights of just a few.

And in the increasingly complex and turbulent organizational environment of the remaining quarter of this century, no small group is going to be smart enough to know the way. This holds for central bureaucratic and planning staffs, the groups who are now most likely to evolve into a near-monopoly of administrative control, backed by central political control. State and party officials in East European countries have been finding out that they cannot, from on high and by themselves, make work even so simple an exercise as manpower planning--detailing educational slots according to labor-force targets. They have been forced by their errors to back off from total dominance by their own bureaucratic and political criteria and to allow more room for the academic judgments of the professors and the choices of the students. As mentioned earlier, some countries in Western Europe are attempting to halt and reverse a long trend of centralization, to move more decision-making away from the single center and out to the many segments of the periphery, closer to the participants and to the realities of local operating conditions.

All organized systems of any complexity are replete with reciprocal ignorance. The expert in one activity will not know the time of day in other activities. The extent of ignorance is uncommonly high in systems of higher education, given their great coverage of fields of knowledge. The

chief state higher education officer may not even be able to do long division let alone high-energy physics, while the professor of physics, until retrained and reoriented, is ignorant in the everyday matters of system coordination. Here we may note a fundamental feature of modern organized life: while higher education has been moving somewhat toward the large hierarchies traditionally more characteristic of business firms and government agencies, such other organizations have been moving toward the traditional organization of higher education, driven to greater dependence on the judgment of experts in different parts of the organization as work becomes more rooted in expertise. Authority flows toward expert judgment in such mechanisms as peer review and committee evaluation. The university remains the best model of how to function as those at the nominal top become more ignorant.

Lesson Three: A Second Great Danger in the Control of Higher Education
is Domination by a Single Form of Organization. No single form will suffice in mass higher education. Here again some of our European counterparts have been fundamentally unlucky, and we can learn from their misfortune. They were swept into mass higher education with sometimes only the nationally-supported public university effectively in place and legitimated as a good place to which to go. The European university has been around for eight centuries, predating in most locales the nation-states that now encompass it. And considering how much ivy clings to Harvard and Yale after a mere two to three centuries, you can guess at the depth of the belief, the sentiment, the commitment of nearly all of Europe, and derivatively other parts of the world, to the simple equation: genuine higher education = university. Thus it becomes extremely difficult to bring other forms into being and make them sufficiently attractive as to play a major role.

The result has been, since 1960, a great overloading, a swamping, of this dominant form, by numbers of students and faculty, and the more heterogeneous demands and functions mentioned earlier. An American can imagine what the overload is like by thinking of our already comprehensive and extended state university taking on the tasks, roles, and clienteles of the state colleges, community colleges, religious private colleges, private universities, etc. Such inclusiveness is precisely the best way to weaken the traditional functions of the university--for example, basic research. It is now problematic whether such research will remain within the university to any major extent in European countries--as "teaching time" drives our "research time" and governments become inclined to sponsor and protect the science they think they need by placing it in research institutes outside the university systems. Differentiation of form has to occur, but it will happen the hard way in those countries where one form has had a traditional monopoly.

In the United States, we are in fairly good shape on this score, despite recent worry about homogenization. We have at least five or six major sectors or types of institutions, and efforts to be at all precise in classifying our 3,000 institutions get into sixteen or more categories as they attempt to give recognition to the extensive differences found among the hundreds of places now called universities, and among the even greater number still called colleges, and among the 1,000 community colleges, etc. Here our problem is currently not severe, since no single form possesses the system. But we may have some cause to worry about voluntary and mandated convergence, as discussed below; and now, while there is time, we can learn from foreign experience that our institutional diversity is a great and necessary resource.

Lesson Four: Institutional Differentiation is the Name of the Game in the Coordination of Mass Higher Education. Lesson four is the flip side of

lesson three, but the point is so fundamental that it can stand restatement. It answers the most important, substantive question in high-level system coordination and governmental policy: will and should our universities and colleges become more alike or more unlike? The pressures of the times in nearly all countries is heavily toward institutional uniformity. Yet the lesson to be learned on this issue from cross-national comparison is that uniform institutions cannot possibly do the job and that institutional differentiation is the prime requirement for system viability.

One of the great pressures for institutional uniformity is the search for equality and equity. For a long time in this country the notion of what constitutes educational equality has been broadening. The first step was a move from the posture that equality of access simply meant equal chances of getting into a limited number of openings--selection without regard to race, color, or creed--to a position that there should be no selection, that the door should be open to all. But while this idea was developing, a differentiated arrangement of colleges and universities was also developing. Everyone could get into the system but not into all parts thereof: we differentiated the roles of the community college, the state college, and the state university, with differential selection as an important part of the roles, and private colleges and universities continued to do business as they pleased. This saved us from some of the deleterious effects of letting everyone in. Now the idea of equality is being carried another step as more observers and practitioners take critical note of our institutional unevenness. The effort will grow to extend the concept of educational equality to mean equal treatment for all. To make this possible, the institutions in a system should be equated.

Europeans have had considerable experience with this latter idea since it has been embedded in those systems that consist of a set of national univer-

sities and not much else. The French, Italians, and others have attempted in a sustained way to administer equality by formally proclaiming and often attempting to treat the constituent parts as equal in program, staff, value of degree, etc. That promise became built into the national systems back in the days when selection was so sharp at the lower levels that only five percent or less graduated from the upper secondary level and were thereby guaranteed a university place of their choosing. But mass elementary and now mass secondary education have virtually eliminated the earlier selection in some countries and radically reduced it in others. As a result, much larger numbers have come washing into the old undifferentiated university structure, like a veritable tide, with all entrants expecting governmentally guaranteed equality of treatment. There has been no open way of steering the traffic, of distinguishing, of differentiating, which is surely the grandest irony of national systems of higher education premised on rational and deliberate administrative control.

This European version of open-door access has been a source of enormous conflict within almost all the systems of the European continent in recent years and the conflict continues unabated. The systems have to find some way to distinguish and differentiate. Otherwise, everyone who enters and wants to go to medical school has the right to go to medical school; everyone who wants to go to the University of Rome will continue to go to the University of Rome--when they last stopped counting, it was well above 150,000, and the French apparently had over 200,000 at the University of Paris before they found a way to break that totality into a dozen and one distinguishable parts. And more degree levels, with appropriate underpinning organization, have to develop, since the more heterogeneous clientele, with its more uneven background and varied aptitude, needs programs of different length and different stopping places, from a two-to-three year degree, to such middle degrees as our bachelor's and master's, to the doctoral degree and post-doctoral training. But to attempt to effect

selection and assignment and barriers now, precisely at the time when the doors have finally swung open, is morally outrageous to the former have-nots and, to the political parties, unions, and other groups that articulate their interests. The battle rages on the national stage, with virtually all education-related ideologies and interests brought into play. We have been saved from this by a combination of decentralization and differentiation.

Other strong pressures for institutional uniformity come more from within higher education systems themselves. One is a movement of sectors, now referred to as academic drift, toward the part that has highest prestige and offers highest rewards. The English have had great difficulty with such voluntary convergence, since the towering prestige of Oxford and Cambridge, built on a six-century headstart and strong placement of graduates in top governmental and educational posts, has inducted various institutions to drift toward their style. In addition, administered systems have so many tendencies toward mandated convergence. Within the European unitary systems, such convergence becomes expressed in a thousand and one details of equating salaries, teaching loads, laboratory spaces, and sabbatical leaves. Most important perhaps is that "have-nots" within the system become pressure groups to catch up with the "haves," e.g., in American state systems, state-college personnel seek equality with university personnel. Then, too, ordinary norms of impartial and fair administration press for system-wide classifications of positions and rewards. And the basic way to expand or contract is by fair shares, everyone going up or down by the same percentage. There is a strong tendency in public administration generally, from Warsaw to Tokyo, to expand and contract in this fashion, equalizing and linking together the main sunk costs, with the result that such costs become more massively restrictive in future budgets.⁸ On this plaguing problem, we have lots of company.

Against all these pressures for convergence and uniformity, there are

fundamental trends that run in the opposite direction, toward differentiation.

The motor power comes from the ever greater division of labor in society and the related greater degree of specialized coverage within higher education.

There is no doubt that the task base of higher education will continue to differentiate. But what is problematic in every advanced society is how to divide up the tasks among organizations. One way is to have a set of formally-equal omnibus universities, each of which attempts full coverage. As indicated, European countries have tended in this direction and have radically overloaded the one form. It will not work.

Since the historical development of our set of institutions has presented us with the necessary differentiation, a central task is to maintain it by legitimating different institutional roles. We have been relatively successful in planning and initiating tripartite structures within our state systems. But what defeats us time and again is a full legitimization of three roles that will fix this division by reducing the forces that would upset it. Here our classic case of the unstable role is the state college. In one state after another, the state colleges will not stay where they are supposed to, according to plan, but at a blinding rate--that is, within a decade or two--evolve into some or all of the competencies of the places already known as universities and alert their printers for the announced change in name that soon will be lobbied through the legislature. In contrast, the two-year colleges have accepted their distinctive role and--outside of Connecticut and a few other backward states--have prospered in it. This in the face of the easiest of all predictions, a quarter-century ago, that this obviously undesirable role would be deserted by two-year places evolving into four-year colleges. That convergence was cut off at the pass, more by the efforts of community college people themselves

than by weakly-manned state offices. There came into being a community college philosophy and a commitment to it, notably in the form of a "movement." Some leaders even became zealots, true believers, glassy eyes and all. Around the commitment, they developed strong interest-group representation and political muscle. Today, no one's patsy, they have a turf, the willingness and ability to defend it, and the drive and skill to explore such unoccupied territory as recurrent education and life-long learning to see how much they can annex. Meanwhile, when did we last hear about a "state college movement"?

If the name of the game is institutional differentiation, the name of differentiation is legitimization of institutional roles.

Lesson Five: Autonomous Action and Planning are Both Needed as Mechanisms of Differentiation, Coordination, and Change. The difference between the acceptance of roles on the part of American community colleges and state colleges, and analogous situations abroad, suggest that we cannot leave everything to the drift of the marketplace and autonomous action within it. Unless the anchorage is there for different roles, institutions will voluntarily converge. But what is to be taken as crucial in planned interventions, since we have also seen that they often do not work and are readily upset when roles are not legitimizd?

One lesson seems to be that well-separated roles stand a better chance of becoming accepted than bordering roles. A strong state college was never far from a weak university in the first place. It took only the addition of a few more Ph.D.s to the faculty and a little more inching into graduate work in order to say: why not us? The role of teachers colleges was once quite different from that of the university, but as teachers colleges evolved innocently into comprehensive state colleges, the institutional role became less distin-

guishable and we were not able to stabilize it. In contrast, the role of our two-year units was inherently far away from what a university did.

Perhaps the rule is: organizational species that are markedly different can live side by side in a symbiotic relation; species that are similar, with heavily-overlapping functions, are likely to conflict, with accommodation taking the form of convergence on a single type.

We may also note that different bases of support and authority seem to have something to do with the stability of differentiated roles. The French

have a set of institutions, the Grandes Écoles, that continue to be well-separated from the universities. Much of the strength of their separation lies in the fact that many of them are supported by ministries other than the ministry of education. In Britain, teachers colleges were in the recent past a distinctive class of institutions, operating under the control of local educational authorities. Now that the national department of education has been getting on top of them, their separation and distinctiveness is being eroded. And, in the United States, the community colleges worked out their separateness primarily under local control. They came into higher education from a secondary school background and, straddling the line, have often been able to play both sides of the street. Their localness has been some protection against becoming stately.

So if we must plan and coordinate at higher levels, and there is no remaining doubt that we must to some degree, then we should be deliberately attempting to separate and anchor institutional roles. An appropriate philosophy for doing so, the intent to do so, and some valiant effort in this direction, need to become benchmarks for state-wide and nation-wide leadership.

But an even higher order of statesmanship is to recognize the great contribution, the essential contribution--past, present, and future--of autonomous action and organic growth. There are numerous reasons for pointing our thinking in this direction. One is the structural basis of our relative success: the twentieth-century strength and pre-eminence of American higher education is rooted in an unplanned disorderliness (in the formal sense) that has thus far permitted different parts to perform different tasks, adapt to different needs, and move in different directions of reform. The benefits of that disorder¹⁰ ought not be inadvertently thrown away as we assemble permanent machinery for state and national coordination.

The second reason for putting great store in emergent developments is that it remains highly problematic whether we can "plan diversity," in the normal sense of planning as an effort to think things through as fully as possible and then draw up and apply a detailed scheme. It is a puzzlement. The arguments for planned diversity are strong: state higher education officials surely can point to some successes in the last two decades on this score, as in the case of new campuses in the New York state system that have distinguishing specialties. But we must not congratulate ourselves too soon,¹¹ since we have not had the chance to see our immature central staffs settle down as enlarged central bureaucracies loaded with responsibilities, expectations, and interest-group demands. We have not had central coordinating machinery long enough for it to become the place that aggregates trouble. But that time will surely come in at least some of our states, and the news from abroad on such matters is not promising. The experience of other countries suggests great caution in thinking that the balance of forces in and around a central office, especially in a

democracy, will permit planned differentiation to prevail over planned and unplanned uniformity. One of the finest thinker-planner-administrators in Europe--Ralf Dahrendorf, now head of the London School of Economics--recently addressed himself to "the problems expansion left behind," in Continental and British higher education, and saw as central the need to distinguish, to differentiate. And he confessed that he had reluctantly come to the conclusion that deliberate differentiation is a contradiction in terms.

Why? Because in the modern world the pressures to have equal access to funds, equal status for all teachers, and so on, are too strong.¹²

Thirdly, general sociological analysis has long pointed to the great part played in the development of various social institutions by unplanned, emergent changes as over against those deliberately enacted. In the face of this sociological sense, people who must make decisions on Monday morning, who want to be rational and are held responsible for getting things done, are, by the nature of their roles, inclined to value and trust deliberate effort while overlooking the value of and even distrusting spontaneously-generated developments. But it is the better part of reality to recognize the imposing weight of the unplanned. As put by Dahrendorf in taking the long view in Britain and Continental Europe: "The more one looks at government action, the more one understands that most things will not be done anyway, but will happen in one way or another."¹³

Hence, our central procedural concern ought to be the relative contribution, and advantages and disadvantages, of planned and autonomous action, especially in regard to differentiation. Both are needed and both are operative, so we need to assess different mixtures of the two. With current combinations tilting toward controlled action, we need to add support to the of or-

ganic developments. We shall need to be increasingly clever about planning for unplanned change, about devising the broad frameworks that encourage the parts of a system to generate, on their own, changes that are creative and adaptive to local contexts, changes not designed by the center.

* * * * *

The changing relation between higher education and government is that higher education is becoming more governmental.¹⁴ It moves inside government, becomes a constituent part of government, a bureau within public administration. On this, perspectives from abroad are invaluable, since others have indeed been there first, and we are the laggards who can look down the road that others have so earnestly traveled. No small point from abroad is inherently transferable, since it is always heavily linked to other items within a matrix and context becomes everything. It is the larger portraits of relations that should catch our attention, principally to stimulate our imagination about options, limits, and potentialities. The 1975 Boyer Seminar in Aspen made a case for "The Monday Morning Imagination," for efforts to bring closer together the world of the imagination and the realities of Monday morning, two realms that are often radically split.¹⁵ The state chancellors and others gathered together in that Workshop were invited to be "speculative and imaginative and creative." One way to do so is to let the mind wander to new visions, in the Aspen style, even off to fundamental assumptions about man and society. Another way to imagine possibilities is to take seriously the experiences of others, especially those of similar commitment in other nations. A global perspective on higher education steers us to the experiences of others, in contexts that are both similar to and different from our own, with the similarities providing a bridge and the differences stirring the mind to

be speculative and imaginative and creative. To help develop broad frame-
works that will help others to make wiser decisions on Monday morning is
reason enough to view higher education cross-nationally and to draw with
increasing care some lessons from abroad.

Footnotes

1 John Brademas, "Education and Public Policy," Educational Researcher, Volume 6, Number 4, April 1977, pp. 4-7. Condensed from the book The American Pattern, 1977 (forthcoming).

2 A helpful presentation on this point may be found in David Krathwohl, "Improving Educational Research and Development." Educational Researcher, Volume 6, Number 4, April 1977, pp. 8-14.

3 Brademas, op.cit., p. 5.

4 On academic structure in France, see John H. Van de Graaff and Dorothea Furth, "France," in John H. Van de Graaff (editor), Academic Power: Patterns of Authority in Seven National Systems of Higher Education (forthcoming). On Italy, see Burton R. Clark, Academic Power in Italy: Bureaucracy and Oligarchy in a National University System. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977; and Burton R. Clark, "Italy," in Van de Graaff, op.cit.

5 On East Germany (the German Democratic Republic), see Geoffrey J. Giles, "The Structure of Higher Education in the German Democratic Republic," Yale Higher Education Research Group Working Paper #12, October 1976; and on Poland, Aleksander Matejko, "Planning and Tradition in Polish Higher Education," Monerva, Volume VII, Number 4, Summer 1969, pp. 621-48.

6 On West Germany, see John H. Van de Graaff, "Germany," in Van de Graaff, op.cit.

7 Burton R. Clark and Ted I. K. Youn, Academic Power in the United States: Comparative, Historical, and Structural Perspectives. ERIC/Higher Education Research Report No. 3, 1976. Washington, D.C.: The American Association for Higher Education. "Continental and British Modes of Academic Organization," pp. 3-9.

8 Japanese public administration has been notably oriented in this direction, around the concept of baransu, or evenhandedness in changes in the budget. John Creighton Campbell, "Japanese Budget Baransu," in Ezra F. Vogel (editor), Modern Japanese Organization and Decision-Making. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975, pp. 71-100.

9 As put by R.E. Lieuallen, Chancellor of the Oregon State System of Higher Education: "Statewide system leaders have a responsibility to articulate the virtues of institutional diversity, and to seek to distribute resources to reward institutions for doing well the more limited tasks associated with such diversity." (Italics in the original.) R.E. Lieuallen, "The Ecological Frame of Mind," in Martin Kaplan (editor), The Monday Morning Imagination: Report from the Boyer Workshop on State University Systems. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977, p. 132.

10 Burton R. Clark, "The Benefits of Disorder," Change, October 1976, pp. 31-37.

11 E.g., as in parts of The Monday Morning Imagination, op.cit.

12 Ralf Dahrendorf, "The Problems Expansion Left Behind," The Times Higher Education Supplement, June 10, 1977, p. 5.

13 Dahrendorf, ibid.

14 Cf. Dwight Waldo, "The University in Relation to the Governmental-Political," in Clyde J. Wingfield (editor) The American University: A Public Administration Perspective. Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1970, pp. 19-36...

15 The Monday Morning Imagination, op.cit.

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